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Abstract 
Morality, which refers to characteristics such as trustworthiness and honesty, has a primary 
role in social perception and judgment. A negativity effect characterizes the morality 
dimension, whereby negative information is weighed more than positive information in trait 
attribution and impression formation. This article reviews the literature on the negativity 
effect in trait attribution and impression formation. We examine the main boundary 
conditions of the negativity effect by considering relevant moderators such as behavior 
consistency and evaluative extremity, level of categorization, and measurement type as well 
as some theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in the literature. We also review recent 
studies showing that social perceivers hold negative assumptions about people’s morality. We 
outline future directions for research on the negativity effect that should consider trait 
extremity, use alternative measures to the perceived frequency of behaviors, introduce more 
precise definitions of relevant constructs such as diagnosticity, and test different schemata of 
trait-behavior relations.  
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Being Honest and Acting Consistently: Boundary Conditions of the Negativity Effect in 
the Attribution of Morality 
Studies on morality in trait attribution, social perception and judgment have 
burgeoned in the last decade (e.g., Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Ellemers, van der Toorn, 
Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019; Goodwin, 2015; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Mende-
Siedlecki, Baron, & Todorov, 2013; Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, & Ketelaar, 2005). 
Research in this field has shown that characteristics related to morality such as honesty and 
trustworthiness, which refer to human benevolence and correctness in social interactions, 
have a primary role in shaping the perceptions of ourselves and the others (Brambilla & 
Leach, 2014; Brambilla et al., 2011; Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016, 
2018; Leach et al., 2007). This primacy of morality has been interpreted from a socio-
functionalist perspective as originating from a motivation to establish whether someone 
represents an opportunity or a threat for the self (Brambilla, Biella, & Freeman, 2018; 
Brambilla et al., 2011, 2012, 2013; De Bruin & Van Lange, 2000; Rusconi et al., 2017; 
Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). 
Furthermore, an asymmetry characterizes the positive and negative poles of the morality 
dimension. Indeed, a negativity effect has been found, whereby negative information is 
weighed more than positive information when making trait judgments and forming 
impressions of other people’s morality (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989). The literature has pointed out several mechanisms that might contribute to 
the explanation of the negativity effect (e.g., Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991) revealing the complex nature of this asymmetry (Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990). 
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Previous reviews on the negativity effect were broad in scope as they considered  a 
wide range of phenomena and processes (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; 
Taylor, 1991). Building on these prior works, our review aims to provide an updated 
description of the different models on the negativity effect, showing that these different 
accounts are not necessarily in contradiction to one another. Moreover, we intend to highlight 
some empirical inconsistencies about the impact of negative moral information on social 
judgment. We argue that research on the negativity effect, especially in the morality domain, 
should consider relevant boundary conditions (cognitive and affective moderators) that could 
account for those contradictions. By doing so, we will highlight some open issues and suggest 
future research avenues that might contribute to extend this area of social cognition.  
The Negativity Effect and its Accounts 
An information-processing bias affects information integration, impression formation, 
and evaluative processes in general, whereby social perceivers assign more weight to 
negative information and events than positive ones of equal intensity. For example, gaining 
enemies would be weighed more than gaining friends (Baumeister et al., 2001; Kanouse, 
1984; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991; Ybarra, 2002).  
This negativity effect challenges the basic version of an averaging model of 
impression formation that assumes that equal weights are assigned to the adjectives on which 
an impression is based (Anderson, 1965, 1968; Anderson & Alexander, 1971). Anderson 
already noted that findings departing from the simplified version of the averaging model 
could be explained by people’s tendency to assign more weight to extremely negative 
information (Anderson & Alexander, 1971, p. 314). 
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Several explanations have been put forward to explain the enhanced weight to 
negative information (for previous reviews, see Baumeister et al., 2001; Kanouse, 1984; 
Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 
1991; see also Trafimow et al., 2005). Kanouse (1984) classified them in “micro-level” and 
“macro-level” accounts. Micro-level accounts focus on processes: perception, attention, 
memory, and judgment. Macro-level accounts focus on the social perceiver’s goals and the 
wider context. In addition to these accounts, the negativity effect has been explained with 
reference to cognitive processes and variables (e.g., constructs, previous knowledge, 
diagnosticity and implicit assumptions, e.g., Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder, Henderson, & 
Sullivan, 1982; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989), and socio-functionalist and affective 
processes (e.g., Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Reeder, 
2009; Trafimow et al., 2005). In the present review, we will categorize these accounts into 
cognitive explanations, encompassing both cognitive processes and cognitive structures, and 
motivational and affective explanations, based on evaluative (e.g., like-dislike) judgments 
and the social perceiver’s reactions (e.g., arousal). We will also consider the interplay 
between cognitive and motivational accounts. 
Cognitive Explanations 
Novelty. Within the cognitive explanations of the negativity effect, some theories 
focused on the role of social perceivers’ expectations and the contrast between those a priori 
beliefs and the social stimuli. Some of these accounts rely on perceptual contrast and, in 
particular, on a comparison between objective stimuli and the perceiver’s anchors (Helson, 
1947, 1948; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). Negative stimuli contrast more strongly than positive 
stimuli do given that social perceivers are anchored on moderately positive expectations. For 
example, a dishonest behavior would be evaluated more negatively than it objectively should 
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be because it is distant from the subjective anchor which is shifted toward a moderately 
positive (moral) behavior. 
In a similar vein, Fiske (1980) emphasized the role of novel information by focusing 
on attentional processes. She found that attention (operationalized as looking times) taps into 
the differential weight participants assigned to negative, as opposed to positive, information. 
Fiske’s (1980) novelty approach assumes that social perceivers generally hold moderately 
positive expectations about other people’s behaviors. Thus, a negative behavior would be 
novel, unexpected and consequently more informative and influential on impressions. The 
same assumption based on the discrepancy between the social perceiver’s expectations and 
other people’s behaviors is shared by Jones & Davis' (1965) correspondent inference theory. 
Jones and co-authors (Jones, 1976; Jones & Harris, 1967) show that during the impression-
formation process on social targets the social perceiver assigns a greater weight to 
information and behaviors that do not conform to social norms thus being unexpected, 
distinct and informative (Jones & McGillis, 1976; see also Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).  
Fiske’s (1980) and Jones and colleagues’ (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 
1976) accounts both rely on violations of expectations in terms of behaviors’ novelty or non-
normativity. They can thus be classified under the same umbrella (Skowronski & Carlston, 
1989 labeled them “frequency-weight” theories). However, these two theories differ because 
Fiske’s (1980) approach focuses on the role of attention whereas Jones et al.’s (Jones & 
Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976) theory is based on the social perceiver’s constructs 
about the social desirability of behaviors. Both accounts have been criticized for the lack of 
direct evidence for the role of novelty and non-normativity in causing the negativity effect 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). As such, Pratto and John (1991), in a color-naming task, 
showed participants’ greater latency in naming the color of undesirable trait adjectives (e.g., 
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“mean”) than of positive traits (e.g., “sincere”). This finding was interpreted as evidence for 
an automatic attentional processing of negative stimuli. The authors also found an incidental 
learning effect, whereby participants, on average, recalled twice as many undesirable traits as 
desirable traits (Pratto & John, 1991, Experiment 2). This negativity effect in attention and 
memory was not explained by the relative greater novelty of undesirable traits compared to 
desirable traits because the manipulation of perceived trait base rates did not yield any 
significant effects (Pratto & John, 1991, Experiment 3). 
Range underlying behaviors and diagnosticity. A second class of cognitive 
explanations for the negativity effect are the theories that focus on the uncertainty underlying 
behaviors and how people gauge it to form an impression (Birnbaum, 1972; Wyer, 1974). 
These “range” theories assume that social behaviors are underlain by a range of possible 
values and the width of this range of values determines the behavior’s level of ambiguity. The 
narrower is the distribution of the values underlying the judgment of a behavior, the less 
ambiguous and the more influential that behavior is. Negative stimuli are characterized by 
narrower ranges because they are perceived as less various and ambiguous, thus being 
weighed more in people’s impressions than positive stimuli (Birnbaum, 1972, 1974; 
Birnbaum, Parducci, & Gifford, 1971; Wyer, 1974). In a comparison of averaging and range 
models, Birnbaum (1972) found that the latter better captured ratings (“how wrong that pair 
of actions would be in terms of your own personal set of values”, Birnbaum, 1972, p. 36) of 
pairs of immoral behaviors (e.g., “poisoning a neighbor’s dog whose barking bothers you”, 
“keeping a dime you find in a telephone booth”, Birnbaum, 1972, p. 36) than averaging 
models did. Birnbaum advanced an “overlap of value hypothesis” to interpret these results. 
According to this hypothesis, perceivers’ pair ratings would be based on the range and mean 
of the overlapping values between the two distributions of possible values underlying those 
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behaviors. The narrowest of the two distributions of possible values (the one of the more 
immoral behavior) would thus shift the final value of the pair rating. A limitation of the range 
theories is that they do not provide an explanatory mechanism for the reduced uncertainty 
that characterizes negative information (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). 
The cognitive explanations analyzed above share a criticism: They do not take into 
account the moderating role of trait content (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989; Trafimow 
et al., 2005). In contrast, two complementary theories can account for the differences 
between, for example, competence-related and morality-related traits: The schematic model 
of trait attribution (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder et al., 1982) and the cue-diagnosticity 
account (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  
The schematic model. Reeder and colleagues analyzed how traits related to morality, 
competence, and preference differ in relation to behavioral expectations (also called 
“implicational schemata”; Reeder, 1993, 1997, 2006; Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992; 
Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder et al., 1982). Trait-behavior relations are abstract 
assumptions that people hold on the range of behaviors associated with a trait. For example, 
one of these implicational schemata is the “hierarchically restrictive schema” (Reeder & 
Brewer, 1979; Reeder et al., 1982), whereby social perceivers assume that an honest person 
would attempt to refrain from any dishonest behaviors, thus she/he would be restricted to 
honest behaviors only. Conversely, a dishonest person is thought to try to behave across the 
whole spectrum, from dishonest to honest behaviors, thus she/he is behaviorally unrestricted 
(see Figure 1). A reverse asymmetry characterizes the competence dimension. For example, 
intelligent people are thought capable of both intelligent and unintelligent behaviors 
depending on the circumstances, but unintelligent people are not thought capable of 
intelligent behaviors (Reeder et al., 1982, p. 357). In other words, echoing Woody Allen: 
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“The advantage of being intelligent is that we can always play stupid; however, the opposite 
is completely impossible”. These trait-behavior relations play an important role in trait 
attribution since the trait inference based on behaviors related to the unrestrictive pole (e.g., 
immorality- and competence-related behaviors) is enhanced (Reeder, 1993, 1997, 2006). 
The cue-diagnosticity account. The cue-diagnosticity approach (Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987, see also 1989) builds on the schematic model by Reeder and colleagues and it 
focuses on how a cue (i.e., a behavior) can distinguish between alternative categorizations 
(i.e., the actor has or not a specific trait; e.g., Skowronski, 2002). This categorization is 
influenced by the diagnosticity of the behaviors or cues used to make the decision. Cue-
diagnosticity refers to the ability of a cue to discriminate between two alternative trait 
categories: The more frequently and exclusively a cue is linked to the members of a target 
category compared to its alternative, the more diagnostic it is (e.g., Skowronski, 2002).  
Skowronski and Carlston (1987) used a normalized proportion encompassing the 
perceived likelihoods of trait-inconsistent and trait-consistent behaviors as a measure of the 
diagnosticity of a behavior for a trait category (the “cue-validity index”). They found that 
people perceived negative morality behaviors and positive competence behaviors as more 
diagnostic than their opposites (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, Experiment 1). Furthermore, 
perceived behavior diagnosticity, as measured by cue validity, mimicked the pattern of 
participants’ perceived likelihoods of trait-inconsistent behaviors (Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987, Figures 1-2). This similarity between the results yielded by the cue-validity index and 
the likelihood of trait-inconsistent behaviors shows the tight connection between the cue-
diagnosticity account and Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) schematic model, which also describes 
the same positivity and negativity effects in relation to trait-inconsistent behaviors along the 
competence and morality dimensions (e.g., Singh & Teoh, 2000). 
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The positivity effect in the competence domain, whereby positive information about a 
person’s competence (e.g., a high performance on a difficult test) carries more weight than 
negative information (e.g., a failure) on impressions (Heider, 1958; Reeder et al., 1982; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989), is problematic in the perspective of the novelty 
approach (Fiske, 1980), the correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & 
McGillis, 1976), and the range theories (Birnbaum, 1972; Wyer, 1974) that cannot account 
for this content asymmetry. Indeed, these theories focus on the role played by negative 
stimuli, in terms of their contrast to the social perceiver’s moderately positive expectations 
(Helson, 1947, 1948; Sherif & Sherif, 1967), their novelty (Fiske, 1980), non-normativity 
(Jones & Davis, 1965), and reduced ambiguity (Birnbaum, 1972; Wyer, 1974), thus being 
unable to account for the situations in which positive information has an enhanced weight 
(e.g., Trafimow et al., 2005). However, the positivity effect in the competence domain can be 
accounted for by the schematic model and the cue-diagnosticity account.  
An alternative to these accounts that are based on the informativeness of behaviors is 
represented by the frequency-based theories. 
Frequency. The studies by Mende-Siedlecki and co-authors (2013) and Sanbonmatsu 
and colleagues (2015) indicate that behavior frequency and perceived rarity might contribute 
to explaining both negativity and positivity effects in impression formation (Mende-Siedlecki 
et al., 2013; Sanbonmatsu, Mazur, Behrends, & Moore, 2015). For example, in a social 
neuroscience research, Mende-Siedlecki and co-authors tested the hypothesis that the 
perceived frequency of behaviors determines participants’ updates of initial impressions after 
receiving contradictory behavioral evidence (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013). They found that 
positive behaviors in the competence domain and negative behaviors in the morality domain 
were perceived as less frequent than the corresponding behaviors of opposite valence. 
NEGATIVITY EFFECT IN TRAIT ATTRIBUTION
  11 
 
 
Furthermore, these less frequent behaviors determined larger absolute changes in impression 
ratings about a target person than their correspondent, opposite behaviors did.  
In a similar way, Sanbonmatsu and colleagues (2015) focused on the perceived base-
rate frequency of trait-consistent behaviors (e.g., how frequently people behave aggressively 
when given the chance to behave either aggressively or not aggressively) as the process at the 
basis of trait attribution and the differential attributional weight assigned to immoral vs. 
moral and competent vs. incompetent behaviors. They found that the perceived commonality 
or rarity of behaviors determined the number of instances needed to confirm or disconfirm a 
trait via the mediation of participants’ behavioral expectations (i.e., the social perceiver’s 
assumptions about the behaviors expected from an actor with a trait).  
These works are not in contradiction with Fiske’s (1980) and Jones and colleagues’ 
(Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976) explanations, since the violation of normative 
behaviors not only contravenes expectations but it is also rarer than normative-consistent 
behaviors. Thus all these works build on the notion of perceived rarity, more precisely on 
Kelley's (1973) criterion of consensus (how common a response to a stimulus is). 
Motivational and Affective Explanations 
We review the motivational and affective explanations of the negativity effect 
together because some theories interpret the social perceivers’ affective reactions as 
intertwined with their motivation to adaptively respond to negative events (see the approach-
avoidance continuum of behaviors in Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; for a similar categorization 
of affect-based explanations see Skowronski, 2002). The motivational and affective 
explanations of the negativity effect consider both the micro level of physiological responses 
and the macro level of the social perceivers’ motivations to avoid threatening stimuli, as well 
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as their affective reactions to other people’ negative behaviors. These views are compatible 
with the cognitive ones although the underlying mechanism that is hypothesized is different.  
Neuro-physiological accounts. The role of motivation has been highlighted by 
Cacioppo and colleagues who proposed specific motivational systems underlying positivity 
and negativity effects (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; 
Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). The authors criticized the bivariate evaluative plane, 
whereby the positive and negative evaluative processes fall along a single, bipolar continuum 
(for example, from ‘hostile’ to ‘hospitable’, Cacioppo et al., 1997) and they are reciprocally 
activated because they are the endpoints (i.e., very positive and very negative) of the same 
continuum (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). In this sense, positive and negative evaluative 
processes underlying attitudes are also interchangeable because when one of the two 
increases the other one decreases. For example, if a stimulus is regarded as maximally 
hostile, it will also be evaluated as minimally hospitable. Instead of this single, bipolar 
conceptualization of the evaluative processes underlying attitudes, the authors introduced a 
bivariate model of evaluative space, whereby positive and negative evaluative processes are 
underlain by relatively separable neural correlates and motivational systems that guide the 
social perceiver’s action toward a goal. In addition to the reciprocal (bipolar) activation of 
positive and negative evaluative processes, this model of evaluative space allows for other 
combinations of positive and negative activations (i.e., negative, positive, and non-significant 
correlations, Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998). This model explains the negativity effect in terms 
of different activation functions underlying positivity and negativity, whereby the activating 
input increases the motivational output to a higher rate for negativity than for positivity (Ito et 
al., 1998). In other words, the negativity effect is due to the greater response of the negative 
as opposed to the positive motivational system to equivalent amounts of activation (Ito et al., 
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1998). Without any additional specifications, the model of evaluative space does not account 
for the moderating role of trait content (e.g., morality vs. competence). 
Taylor (1991) has also discussed the greater physiological arousal associated with 
negatively valenced stimuli in terms of a short-term mobilization that animals and humans 
undergo when they initially respond to negative events. After this initial phase, an automatic 
physiological response triggers the minimization of the negative events. The minimization of 
the negativity effect can also occur due to motivational factors, as reviewed by Baumeister et 
al. (2001). An example is the fading affect bias, whereby the emotional intensity for 
autobiographical memories of unpleasant events fades faster than that for pleasant memories 
over time (Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997). The authors interpreted this finding in terms 
of people’s motivation to minimize the negative affect associated with one’s memory to 
protect the self and to manage others’ impression by presenting a positive self-image.  
In line with this interpretation in terms of self-serving biases, Skowronski, Betz, 
Thompson, and Shannon (1991) found an enhanced recall for pleasant, as opposed to 
unpleasant, events recorded in a diary related to the self except for events whose occurrence 
was considered to be highly typical or highly atypical. In other words, an example of Taylor’s 
(1991) minimization stage comes from studies on self and memory. These include the works 
on self-enhancement showing individuals’ tendency to recall fewer negative behaviors central 
to their self-conception (i.e., behaviors related to untrustworthiness and unkindness) when 
self-referenced compared to positive ones (i.e., behavioral instances of trustworthiness and 
kindness) and to those referred to another person in order to protect themselves against 
threats to the self (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008).   
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Affective accounts. An example of the compatibility of the cognitive and affective 
accounts of the negativity effect comes from Peeters and Czapinski’s (1990) behavioral-
adaptive theory. The negativity effect would be part of a positive-negative asymmetry and it 
would be functional to avoiding aversive stimuli and to limit the risks of an approach 
tendency toward stimuli that could be detrimental if generalized to all, and not only positive, 
stimuli. The behavioral-adaptive theory can explain the same asymmetries in the morality vs. 
competence domains accounted for by cognitive theories such as the schematic model and the 
cue-diagnosticity account. Peeters and colleagues (e.g., Peeters, 1989) found a negativity 
effect only when an “other-profitable” evaluative dimension was involved. This dimension 
encompasses attributes whose perceived adaptive relevance relates to others as opposed to 
the self (self-profitable dimension). The negativity effects have mostly been found when 
using paradigms eliciting judgments on either the likeability or the morality of a person (e.g., 
Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), which are related to the 
approachability of a person for others. Where judgments of a person’s competence, thus 
related to self-profitability, are concerned no negativity effects are found (Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990). 
Beside the “affective negativity effect” along the approach (like) – avoidance (dislike) 
continuum of behaviors described by Peeters and Czapinski (1990), there are other affective 
processes, such as some social perceiver’s reactions to violations of morality, that could also 
contribute to explaining the negativity effect. Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, and Ketelaar 
(2005) found a causal relationship between negative affect associated with violations of 
morality and trait attribution. For example, in their Study 3, negative affect (induced, for 
example, by showing two video clips from the movie Full Metal Jacket) led participants to 
require fewer instances of violations of imperfect duties (e.g., unfriendly behaviors) to 
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disconfirm a positive expectation (e.g., that the target is a friendly person) compared to when 
negative affect was not induced. The authors also showed that the effect of negative affect on 
attribution was produced by a range of emotions including disgust, sadness, and fear. Thus, 
the authors proposed that affect could largely, although not solely, explain the weight people 
assign to immoral behaviors (Trafimow et al., 2005).  
Finally, the social perceiver’s reactions to threatening stimuli could account for the 
enhanced weight to the negative information on a target person’s morality. Studies on social 
hypothesis testing and impression formation have highlighted the role of perceived threat in 
the negativity effect in the morality domain. People tend to look for information that can 
falsify the presence of morality-related traits (e.g., honest), but not sociability- (e.g., friendly) 
and competence-related (e.g., intelligent) traits, in a target person (Brambilla et al., 2011). 
The authors’ socio-functionalist interpretation in terms of a protecting information-search 
strategy to avoid the risks of potentially harmful, immoral behaviors was corroborated by a 
subsequent study. In that study, Brambilla and co-workers (2012) found that the relationship 
between morality-based descriptions of a fictitious ethnic group (the Ortandesi) and group 
global impressions (measured in terms of their feelings of affection, hostility, hatred, and 
suspect) was mediated by perceived threat (measured by the following items: “The Ortandesi 
pose a threat to Italian citizens”, “the Ortandesi pose a threat to Italian values and beliefs”, 
“the Ortandesi are dangerous for the stability of Italian economic system”, “the Ortandesi 
threaten the Italian culture”, Brambilla et al., 2012, Study 3). 
The Interplay between Cognitive and Motivational/Affective Factors 
As previously discussed, the motivational and affective explanations are not in 
contradiction with the cognitive accounts of the negativity effect. In contrast, there is an 
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interplay between cognitive and motivational/affective factors underlying the negativity 
effect in the morality domain.  
We have previously reviewed studies on self-enhancement and memory distortion, 
whereby individuals’ memory for self-referenced behavioral instances that would threaten 
core aspects of their self, such as immoral behaviors (e.g., related to untrustworthiness) are 
recalled worse than positive exemplifications of those traits as well as compared to memory 
of other people’s central negative behaviors (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 
2000, 2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). These studies indicate how motivations to protect the 
self can bias cognitive processes, such as memory. Additional evidence of this motivational-
cognitive interplay comes from the studies on autobiographical memories by Walker et al.'s 
(1997) showing the enhanced emotional intensity associated with pleasant compared to 
unpleasant events over time (the fading affect bias), and by Skowronski et al.'s (1991) 
indicating enhanced recall for pleasant, as opposed to unpleasant, events related to the self as 
a function of their typicality in relation to the target.  
These studies are not the only ones to provide evidence for the compatibility of the 
analysis of cognitive processes, such as memory, with a socio-motivational framework to 
increase our understanding of the negativity effect. For instance, the role of an actor’s 
motives has been the focus of the multiple inference model proposed by Reeder and 
colleagues (Reeder, 2009; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Reeder, 
Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004). This model further specifies the schematic model, 
which was based on how the social perceivers use implicit assumptions about trait-behavior 
relations to adjust their initial dispositional inferences (Reeder, 1993; Reeder et al., 1982). 
For example, an immoral behavior, such as stealing money from a charity (Reeder & Spores, 
1983), would lead to a behavior-correspondent trait inference of immorality regardless of 
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situational demands, such as having being requested to steal the money. In contrast, making a 
donation would lead to a weaker behavior-correspondent trait inference of morality when the 
situation facilitated the behavior, such as when someone requested to make the donation 
(Reeder & Spores, 1983). The multiple inference model explains the negativity effect in 
attributions of morality by considering the consistency between the perceived actor’s motives 
and the behavior-correspondent trait (Reeder, 2009). For example, if the observer infers that 
the actor is donating money to ingratiate the person who requested the donation, then this 
motive would be perceived as inconsistent with the presence of high levels of a morality-
related trait and it would lead to a weaker behavior-correspondent attribution of morality. 
Vice versa, the ingratiation motive would be perceived as consistent with the actor’s low 
morality in the case of stealing money, and thus the behavior-correspondent inference of 
immorality would be made (Reeder, 2009). 
Another example of the motivational/affective and cognitive interplay in producing 
the negativity effect comes from research showing that people’ attention to negative morality 
information about a person is so high that they are not motivated to pay attention to additional 
information they receive about that person’s competence (De Bruin & Van Lange, 2000, 
Study 2).  
Recent work by Rusconi et al. (2017) has shown a reversal of the negativity effect in 
the morality domain when perceivers are asked to judge the likelihood or frequency of trait-
inconsistent behaviors for moderate levels of both traits (e.g., “sincere”) and behaviors (e.g., 
“covering for somebody”). The observed tendency to question a person’s morality by 
assuming that she/he would more likely behave inconsistently than an immoral person was 
interpreted by the authors with reference to a socio-functionalist perspective, whereby 
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perceivers are motivated to avoid the risk of omitting the detection of potential sources of 
threat (e.g., immoral behaviors).  
Furthermore, emotional responses are linked to and they might even encompass 
cognitive variables. For example, frequency might underlie the affective reactions to immoral 
behaviors. The emotions manipulated by Trafimow and colleagues (2005) in their study on 
the causal role of affect in the negativity effect in the morality domain differ in terms of how 
often they occur in daily life. For instance, a study by Myrtek (2004) found that disgust was 
reported less frequently than sadness and anxiety/fear. Furthermore, emotions are not 
necessarily at odds with cognition given the tight link between the two (Frijda, Manstead, & 
Bem, 2000), and the cognitive components (e.g., appraisals) involved in emotions (e.g., 
Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Trafimow et al., 2005).  
The Boundary Conditions of The Negativity Effect  
In this section, we will review the main moderators of the negativity effect emerged 
from the research conducted in the last four decades as the literature has not yet provided a 
systematization. As previously discussed, a key and long known moderator of the negativity 
effect in evaluative processes is the self-profitable (competence-related) vs other-profitable 
(morality-related) dimension (e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Reeder et al., 1982; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989). That is why several studies has focused their analysis 
of the negativity effect on the morality domain (e.g., Skowronski, 2002; Trafimow et al., 
2005). However, research in the last few decades has pointed out some additional boundary 
conditions to the negativity effect. The relevance of examining boundary conditions lie in the 
opportunity they give scholars to cast light on the limits of the existing theories thus fostering 
their refinement or the development of new ones to enhance our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying this phenomenon.  
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Consistency of the Behavior Set. According to the cue-diagnosticity account, diagnosticity 
has a role only when there are alternative categories to choose from. If the social perceiver 
examines a single behavior or a homogeneous set of behaviors (e.g., a series of failures) that 
points to the same trait category (e.g., incompetence), then other mechanisms should kick in. 
More specifically, Skowronski (2002; for a similar account see Lupfer et al., 2000) proposed 
that when a single trait category is implied, judgments should be guided by a heuristic (a 
mental shortcut): Representativeness, that is, a judgment based on how similar a behavior is 
to a standard, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A 
similar strategy has been described in the hypothesis-testing literature: Positive testing is an 
information-search strategy that focuses on what is more likely under a working hypothesis, 
such as “incompetence”, than an alternative hypothesis, such as “competence”, e.g., 
(Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, Di Bari, & Sacchi, 2010; Klayman, 1995; Klayman & Ha, 1987; 
McKenzie, 2004). Positive testing and representativeness are akin to the strategy described by 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) for evaluation tasks, whereby people encode evidence with 
reference to their current hypothesis (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992, p. 9). 
Type of Measurement of Trait-Behavior Relations. Trait-behavior relations represent a 
relatively neglected area in attribution research (Reeder, 1993; Reeder et al., 1982). This 
relative neglect has generated inconsistencies and confusion around the manner traits, 
assumptions about traits and behaviors, and the negativity effect are measured in the 
judgment, impression formation, and attribution literatures. A consideration of the different 
types of measurement of trait-behavior relation can foster a reconciliation of some of the 
inconsistencies in the literature that we review here.  
Reeder and colleagues (1982) analyzed the factors influencing the implicit 
assumptions about trait-behavior relations described in the schematic model by Reeder and 
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Brewer (1979). More specifically, they analyzed three determinants of the attribution 
schemes: The social perceiver’s considerations about central tendency (i.e., the tendency to 
use trait adjectives that ‘average’ the observed behaviors), the actor’s competence, and social 
desirability of the actor’s behaviors. To investigate these determinants and their interplay 
with trait content (morality, competence, and preference), they used three measures of trait-
behavior relations based on Heider's (1958) analysis of action (Reeder et al., 1982). Heider’s 
(1958) “naïve analysis of action” focused on the personal and environmental forces 
underlying an actor’s action. The personal force is determined by a power factor (often 
related to competence: can) and a motivational factor (trying). In line with this view, Reeder 
et al. (1982) measured trait-behavior relations in terms of what individuals with a trait can do 
(“perceived potential variability”), operationalized by asking the observers questions such as: 
“To what extent do you think that a person who is very intelligent (unintelligent) can 
adequately portrait a person who is very unintelligent (intelligent)?” (Reeder et al., 1982, p. 
361). In addition, they tested trait-behavior relations in terms of what the actors are perceived 
to try to do (“perceived intended variability”), operationalized as: “If a large reward were 
available for doing so, how likely is it that a person who is very honest (dishonest) would try 
to act very dishonest (honest)?” (Reeder et al., 1982, p. 361). Finally, Reeder and colleagues 
measured how frequently actors are perceived emit behaviors (“perceived general 
variability”), operationalized as: “In general, how often does a very honest (dishonest) person 
act very dishonest (honest)?” (Reeder et al., 1982, p. 361). This latter measure has been the 
most influential in the literature as subsequent works in this field have mostly used measures 
similar to the general variability one (Rusconi et al., 2017; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 
Experiment 1; Tausch, Kenworthy, & Hewstone, 2007, Study 3). Reeder and colleagues 
introduced the general variability measure alongside the intended variability measure to test 
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trait-behavior relations along the morality dimension. The prediction was that both measures 
would elicit an asymmetry in line with Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) model (Reeder et al., 
1982, Table 1). Indeed, due to considerations of desirability, social perceivers would expect 
social actors to try to engage in moral behaviors rather than immoral ones. These intentions 
should then directly translate into behaviors. Thus, social perceivers would also assume that 
individuals would more frequently engage in moral, as opposed to immoral, behaviors 
(Reeder et al., 1982, p. 360). While the findings for the intended variability measure were in 
line with these predictions, the results for the general variability measure were not. In 
particular, in terms of behavior attempts (intended variability), target persons were thought to 
more likely try to behave in a socially desirable (e.g., honest, intelligent) manner than in a 
socially undesirable (e.g., dishonest, unintelligent) manner, more so for traits related to 
morality and competence compared to preference traits. However, in terms of general 
behavior frequency (general variability), the results were less clear-cut. In Experiment 1, 
target persons were deemed to more frequently engage in socially desirable (e.g., honest, 
intelligent) behaviors than in socially undesirable (e.g., dishonest, unintelligent) behaviors, as 
predicted. However, the pattern was similar for morality- and competence-related traits, 
contrary to the prediction of a greater effect for morality. In Experiment 2, there were no 
significant effects concerning the general variability measure. 
Reeder and colleagues (1982) interpreted these unexpected and inconsistent findings 
yielded by the general variability measure in terms of one of the proposed determinants of 
trait-behavior relations, that is, the social perceiver’s considerations of central tendency. 
Social perceivers would assume that it is very unlikely that a person with an extreme (either 
very moral or very immoral) trait would engage in behaviors at the opposite end of the trait 
dimension (either very immorally or very morally). This is because there is a wide 
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discrepancy between the trait and the behavior in terms of extremity (“extreme distance”). 
The authors also proposed an alternative explanation in terms of a “reverse halo effect”, 
whereby moral behaviors would be tainted and seen as immoral when they are emitted by 
immoral persons. These explanations could account for the floor effect found for morality-
related traits at the extreme level of distance. However, they do not account for the 
inconsistencies between the results of the Experiments 1 and 2 when there is a reduced 
discrepancy between a trait and a behavior in terms of level of extremity (“moderate 
distance”). In Experiment 1, an asymmetry toward socially desirable behaviors was found 
when considering people with moderate traits emitting extreme behaviors. In Experiment 2, 
no asymmetry was found when the relations between extreme traits and moderate behaviors 
were examined. In a similar way, central tendency cannot account for Rusconi et al.’s (2017) 
findings. They used a measure similar to the general variability one, for example: “How often 
does an insincere (sincere) person tell the truth (omit some information)?” (Rusconi et al., 
2017, p. 15). Their focus was on the observers’ perceived trait-behavior relations when the 
level of distance between traits and behaviors is null, that is, when they are both moderate in 
terms of evaluative extremity. Across a series of studies using both abstract and concrete 
categories of behaviors and testing both Italian and American participants, they found a 
reversal of the negativity effect in morality along with a positivity effect in competence. In 
other words, participants judged it more likely that a person described as moral would more 
often behave in an immoral manner than the reverse (see Figure 2). Thus, Rusconi et al.’s 
(2017) results indicate that social perceivers hold negative expectations about a moral 
person’s behaviors. This finding dovetails with the results of the study by Meindl and 
colleagues (2016) who, moving from behavior assumptions to trait assumptions, have shown 
that these negative expectations characterize trait attributions as well (e.g., “Imagine you 
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witness a stranger act immorally. How likely is it that they are an immoral person?”, Meindl 
et al., 2016, p. 542). In particular, people are more ready to infer immorality from an immoral 
behavior than unsociability from a cold behavior (“the immoral assumption effect”, Meindl et 
al., 2016). 
In sum, different measures of trait-behavior relations lead to different positive-
negative asymmetries. The lack of a negativity effect when using the general variability 
measure for moderate behaviors (Reeder et al., 1982, Experiment 2) or its reversal when both 
traits and behaviors are moderate (Rusconi et al., 2017) also indicates the need to take into 
account another moderator of the negativity effect: The evaluative extremity of traits and 
behaviors. 
Trait evaluative extremity. Skowronski and Carlston’s (1987, Experiment 1) study used a 
question phrasing that is similar to the one of the general variability measure (“Would an 
honest (dishonest) person ever search for the owner of a lost package?”, Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987, pp. 691-692, see Rusconi et al., 2017, S1 Text). It showed a positivity effect 
for the intelligent/stupid dimension and a negativity effect for the honest/dishonest 
dimension. These findings were interpreted in line with Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) model. 
However, Skowronski and Carlston examined moderate traits (i.e., honest/dishonest and 
intelligent/stupid) in relation to different levels of extremity of the behaviors (i.e., extreme, 
moderate, and neutral). In contrast, Reeder and Brewer’s model predicted the positivity and 
negativity effects mostly to account for relations between extreme traits and extreme 
behaviors, such as very dishonest people committing crimes (see also Rusconi et al., 2017 for 
a discussion).  
In a similar way to Skowronski and Carlston’s (1987, Experiment 1) study, Tausch et 
al. (2007) used moderate traits in their extension of Rothbart and Park’s work on the (dis-
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confirmability of traits. In their Study 3, they used a measure of the likelihood of trait-
inconsistent behaviors that was similar to Skowronski and Carlston’s (1987, Experiment 1) 
dependent variable and Reeder et al.’s (1982) measure of general variability (“how likely it is 
that someone who possesses the given trait shows trait-inconsistent behaviors 
(diagnosticity)”, Tausch et al., 2007, p. 550, see Rusconi et al., 2017, S1 Text). They tested 
this measure with moderate warmth- and competence-related traits (e.g., “trustworthy”, 
“tolerant”, “intelligent”, “incompetent”). Their results showed a positivity effect in the 
competence domain and a negativity effect in the warmth domain. These findings are in 
keeping with Skowronski and Carlston’s (1987), Experiment 1, and they were interpreted as 
consistent with Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) model, which, however, as explained above, 
predicted positivity and negativity effects mostly for extreme levels of both traits and 
behaviors.  
In other words, both Skowronski and Carlston (1987, Experiment 1) and Tausch et al. 
(2007, Study 3) found positivity and negativity effects along the competence and morality 
dimensions, respectively, despite they used moderate traits. This could suggest that the level 
of extremity of traits is not crucial to produce positivity and negativity effects. However, 
there is not much systematic research on how trait extremity (e.g., “honest/dishonest” vs. 
“very honest/very dishonest”) affects trait relations to behaviors at different levels of 
extremity (for an exception see the study by Reeder et al., 1982 previously described). In 
particular, whether the use of extreme traits would elicit positivity and negativity effects of 
the same magnitude as those found with moderate traits or stronger effects is an open 
question.  
Behavior evaluative extremity. As explained above, Skowronski and Carlston (1987) took 
into account behavior extremity. They found that both morality and competence judgments 
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were characterized by an extremity bias, whereby impressions were more extreme than 
expected if the behaviors they were based on were averaged. In other words, extreme 
behaviors were weighed more than moderate behaviors (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 
Experiment 2). Their data also showed that the more extreme a behavior is, the more 
diagnostic is (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, Figures 3-4). In a subsequent study, Skowronski 
and Carlston found that trait inferences from extremely immoral behaviors and extremely 
intelligent behaviors were more resistant to change following contradictory evidence than 
trait inferences from behaviors of opposite valence (Skowronski & Carlston, 1992; for a 
similar finding concerning impressions of morality see Reeder & Coovert, 1986; see also 
Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013). As the authors noted, the finding about the “intelligent/stupid” 
trait category (but not the one for the “honest/dishonest” dimension) is at odds with Rothbart 
and Park’s (1986) results on the confirmation of positive traits, such as “honest” and 
“intelligent”, that are more difficult to acquire and require more instances to be confirmed 
than their disconfirmation does (Rothbart & Park, 1986, Table 9). They are also inconsistent 
with Tausch et al.’s (2007, Study 2) results of a lack of significant difference between the 
number of instances required to disconfirm positive vs. negative competence-related traits. 
Skowronski and Carlston argued that an explanation of this inconsistency might lie in the 
different methodologies used. Rothbart and Park (as well as Tausch et al.) analyzed the 
(dis)confirmability of traits without presenting any behaviors, thus their participants might 
have thought of the typical, moderate intelligent behaviors encountered in their everyday life. 
In contrast, Skowronski and Carlston presented extreme behaviors to their participants 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1992, pp. 448-449). Thus, Skowronski and Carlston argued that the 
level of extremity of the behaviors on which the trait inferences are based moderates the 
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positivity effect in the competence domain, which should be stronger when social perceivers 
encounter extreme behaviors.  
This account runs counter Wojciszke, Brycz, and Borkenau’s (1993) predictions of a 
stronger positivity effect for moderate behaviors in the competence domain and a stronger 
negativity effect for extreme behaviors in the morality domain. Their predictions rely on an 
approach-avoidance explanation, whereby negative, especially extremely negative, behaviors 
should elicit avoidance and a negativity effect because of their harmful consequences, 
whereas behaviors that are evaluatively moderate should induce approach and a positivity 
effect because they are considered less risky and their consequences more reversible. The 
results of their study were consistent with their hypotheses. They found that trait inferences 
and global evaluations of targets were affected by a stronger positivity effect in the 
competence domain and a lack of the negativity effect in the morality domain for moderate 
levels of traits and behaviors. These results echo those by Czapiński (1986) on stimulus 
traits’ intensity, whereby the strongest negativity effect (the greatest diagnosticity) was found 
for the moderately intense features used to discriminate among target peers (see Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990, Figure 2.2). 
Thus, although evidence interpreted within the cue-diagnosticity framework 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1992) and results interpreted within a motivational-based account 
(Wojciszke et al., 1993) agree on the presence of a negativity effect in the morality domain 
when the available behaviors are evaluatively extreme, they disagree on the level of behavior 
extremity that elicits the positivity effect in the competence domain. According to 
Skowronski and Carlston (1992), the positivity effect is stronger for extreme behaviors, 
whereas for Wojciszke et al. (1993) it is more evident when the available information is 
evaluatively moderate.   
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In keeping with the lack of negativity effect for moderately moral traits and behaviors 
found by Wojciszke et al. (1993), as previously described, Rusconi et al. (2017) found that 
participants assumed that a moderately moral target person was more likely to engage in 
moderately trait-inconsistent behaviors than a moderately immoral target person was. Future 
research should investigate trait-behavior relations at moderate levels of both traits and 
behaviors (null extremity distance) related to morality by using the intended variability 
measure, which was specifically introduced to test the morality dimension (Reeder et al., 
1982).  
Level of Categorization: The Moderation of Perceived Target Entitativity. The schematic 
model by Reeder and Brewer (1979) argues that the social perceiver interprets an individual’s 
behaviors as an organized pattern rather than a random selection from all the possible actions. 
In this sense, the schematic model echoes Asch's (1946) analysis of the configural model of 
impression formation, whereby the different traits that characterize a person are perceived as 
interrelated and they thus contribute to a unitary impression of a person (Asch, 1946). It 
follows that the schematic model predicts a negativity effect in the morality domain for 
judgments involving a “unit formation”, that is, for target individuals or groups made up of 
individuals related to one another, but not for aggregates of individuals unrelated to each 
other (Coovert & Reeder, 1990; Reeder & Coovert, 1986). Coovert and Reeder (1990, 
Experiment 1) confirmed this prediction. They found a negativity effect in morality 
impressions when the target was a person (described by two different, either moral or 
immoral, behaviors) or a pair of two friends (each described by one behavior), but not when 
the target was a pair of unrelated individuals (each described again by one behavior). 
Skowronski (2002) also examined the negativity and positivity effects at the individual vs. 
group level. In a series of experiments, he presented participants with sets of 
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consistent/inconsistent behaviors related to honest/dishonesty and intelligence/unintelligence 
performed by either individuals or social club members or family members. Participants were 
then asked to make utility, risk/reward, consistency, evaluative, and trait judgments. He 
found that both the negativity and positivity effects were reduced in judgments of groups 
(i.e., families and social clubs). This finding is expected from a diagnosticity perspective 
given the greater variability (and amount) of behaviors that we could expect from a member 
of a group as opposed to an individual. For example, a member of an honest group should be 
perceived as more likely to act dishonestly than an honest individual should (Skowronski, 
2002, p. 139). Although families fit with Coovert and Reeder’s definition of “unit formation” 
because they represent a “meaningful group” rather than a mere “aggregate” (Coovert & 
Reeder, 1990), and thus impressions of families should be affected by the negativity bias, it 
should be noted that also Coovert and Reeder (1990) found that the negativity effect was 
strongest when the target was a person rather than a meaningful group.  
In line with these results, the study by Welbourne (1999) showed greater positivity 
and negativity effects for individuals than groups in an impression-formation task. More 
specifically, individual targets were rated lower on kindness than group targets when 
participants formed impressions based on inconsistent (a mix of kind, unkind, and irrelevant) 
behaviors. Vice versa, intelligence ratings were more positive for individuals than for groups. 
Participants were also asked to rate the expected and actual consistency in behaviors of 
individual vs. group targets. This measure was used to capture the perceived entitativity of 
individuals and groups. The results indicated that participants were more influenced by the 
behavior inconsistency of individuals rather than groups, thus suggesting that they expected a 
greater behavioral unity from individuals than groups (Welbourne, 1999, Study 1). However, 
the greater entitativity of individual vs. groups, operationalized as behavioral consistency, did 
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not account for the differences in morality and competence ratings between individuals and 
groups when experimentally manipulated (Welbourne, 1999, Study 2). In a third study, 
Welbourne (1999) operationalized entitativity in a different way, as a unity of target’s 
intentions and goals. This study revealed a greater negativity effect in the morality domain 
for (either individual or group) targets high in entitativity as opposed to low-entitativity 
targets (in the competence domain there was only a trend toward positivity). According to the 
author, these findings show that only when the social perceivers expect that the target’s 
behaviors are underlain by unified intentions and goals (thus indicating high entitativity) they 
will try and resolve any perceived behavioral inconsistency of the target by applying the 
attribution schemas based on diagnosticity. These schemas yield the negativity and positivity 
effects in the morality and competence domains, respectively. 
According to Skowronski (2002) the reduced negativity effect for groups, as opposed 
to individuals, is not due to the differential processing of behavioral inconsistency for high- 
vs. low-entitativity targets. Evidence against the role of behavioral consistency in driving the 
positivity and negativity effects came from his Experiment 2. Participants were asked to 
make a series of judgments about a target (an individual, a social club or family member, 
depending on the experimental condition) based on a set of either trait-consistent or trait-
inconsistent behaviors. One of the requested judgments was about the consistency of the 
target’s behaviors in a set with one another. The finding that individuals (as opposed to social 
club and family members) were not always perceived as the more behaviorally inconsistent 
targets in the case of trait-inconsistent behavior sets is in contrast with Welbourne’s (1999) 
predictions of a greater effect of individuals’ behavioral inconsistency as opposed to groups’ 
behavioral inconsistency. In a similar way, the perceived consistency of individuals’ 
behaviors was not the greatest in the case of trait-consistent behavior sets, contrary to what 
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we should expect based on Welbourne (1999). In addition, based on Welbourne (1999), the 
perceived inconsistency judgments should mediate trait judgments, in particular the reduced 
positivity and negativity effects for judgments about groups, as opposed to individuals. 
However, the mediational analysis did not provide support for the mediation role of 
consistency judgments (Skowronski, 2002, Experiment 2). Instead, data supported the 
predictions of the cue-diagnosticity account based on the differential diagnosticity of positive 
and negative behaviors. 
Altogether, these studies consistently point to the moderating role of the target’s level 
of categorization, and in particular the perceived unity underlying the target’s actions (target 
entitativity), on the negativity and positivity effects. Cognitive theories based on the 
informativeness of behaviors, such as the schematic model and the cue-diagnosticity account, 
can account for the differences due to target entitativity as shown by the above reviewed 
studies by Coovert and Reeder (1990) and Skowronski (2002, Experiment 2), respectively. In 
contrast, alternative models cannot fully account for the moderation of perceived target 
entitativity. The predictions based on the processing of inconsistency in behaviors 
(Welbourne, 1999) and motivation- and affect-based theories (Ito et al., 1998; Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990) did not receive empirical support (Skowronski, 2002, Experiment 2). 
Finally, the novelty approach (Fiske, 1980), the correspondent inference theory (Jones & 
Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976), expectancy-contrast theories (Helson, 1947, 1948; 
Sherif & Sherif, 1967), and the range theories (Birnbaum, 1972; Wyer, 1974) cannot account 
for target entitativity because they focus on the properties of stimuli such as their novelty 
(Fiske, 1980), and ambiguity (Birnbaum, 1972; Wyer, 1974), and their relationship with the 
social perceiver’s anchors (Helson, 1947, 1948; Sherif & Sherif, 1967) and constructs (Jones 
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& Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976) rather than the organization underlying the target’s 
actions.    
Beliefs in Personality Stability: Entity vs. Incremental Theorists. An individual difference 
in social perception and interaction is the belief that people have in lay theories, such as those 
about the “static”, as opposed to “dynamic”, view of human beings and the world (Levy, 
Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001). For example, people can believe that intelligence- and 
morality-related attributes are fixed (“entity theory”) or malleable (“incremental theory”, 
Dweck, Chiu, Hong, & Inquiry, 1995). Skowronski’s (2002) Experiment 2 tested people’s 
individual difference in beliefs about personality stability. The motivation- and affect-based 
theories predict that social perceivers who believe in personality as fixed (entity theorists) 
and social perceivers who believe in personality as malleable (incremental theorists) are 
differently influenced by stimuli, and thus the trait ratings based on consistent (a 
homogeneous set of honest behaviors) or inconsistent (a set of mostly honest behaviors and 
one dishonest behavior) behaviors should also differ across the two types of theorists. In 
contrast, accounts based on behavior informativeness, in particular the cue-diagnosticity 
account, predict that entity theorists should discount the informativeness of a single, 
inconsistent behavior within a set of otherwise consistent behaviors. Incremental theorists 
should instead be more influenced by a single, inconsistent behavior. In addition, according 
to the cue-diagnosticity account, no differences between entity and incremental theorists 
should be observed when the set of behaviors the judgments are based on is consistent. 
Indeed, as previously discussed, heuristic judgments rather than diagnosticity considerations 
would be used when the examined behaviors imply a single category. The results showed that 
entity theorists were not influenced in their honesty and intelligence trait ratings by a single 
inconsistent behavior within a set of behaviors that consistently implied the same single trait 
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(i.e., either honest, dishonest, intelligent, or unintelligent) to the same extent as incremental 
theorists were. In other words, entity theorists were more influenced in their trait judgments 
by the valence of the majority of the behaviors in a set than were incremental theorists. These 
results are in line with the accounts relying on the informativeness of behaviors, such as the 
schematic model and the cue-diagnosticity account. However, they cannot be fully accounted 
by motivation- and affect-based theories because they predict different patterns of responses 
in entity vs. incremental theorists. In contrast, the pattern of results showed only a different 
polarization in entity vs. incremental theorists’ trait ratings (see Skowronski, 2002, Figure 3).  
No difference between entity theorists and incremental theorists was found when the 
trait judgments were based on a consistent set of behaviors. This lack of difference runs 
counter to the difference predicted by the motivation- and affect-based theories. However, it 
is in line with the prediction of the cue-dagnosticity account, whereby social perceivers 
should rely on heuristic judgments, such as representativeness, rather than on diagnosticity 
considerations when only one trait category is implied by a set of behaviors.  
Self and the Closeness of the Relationship with the Target. As previously reported, self-
enhancement can moderate the negativity effect because individuals tend to exhibit worse 
recall of self-referenced negative behaviors central to the self, such as those pointing to their 
untrustworthiness (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008). In addition, Skowronski and Carlston (1987, Experiment 2) found that negative 
behaviors used in an impression-formation task about 25 different, unknown target persons 
were recalled better than positive behaviors (with the exception of moderately negative 
morality-related behaviors). This recall facilitation did not emerge in the diary study by 
Skowronski et al. (1991) described in a previous section, in which the actors of the behaviors 
were people close to the participants (e.g., their close friends). Skowronski et al. suggested 
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that a close relationship between the observer and the actor might enhance the recall of the 
actor’s positive behaviors. This suggests that the closeness of the observer-actor relationship 
can moderate the negativity effect in memory recall.  
Culture and Historical Period. Unlike previous models’ assumption that social perceivers 
hold moderately positive expectations about other people’s behaviors (Fiske, 1980; Helson, 
1947, 1948; Jones & Davis, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1967), the recent studies by Meindl et al. 
(2016) and Rusconi et al. (2017) point to a “cynical” view of social perceivers who assume 
that even moderately moral people could engage in moderately immoral behaviors (e.g., 
Rusconi et al., 2017). A possible interpretation of this discrepancy is that the perceivers’ 
assumptions about other people’s morality vary across culture and time. A systematic 
analysis of the influence of cultural factors is needed as research in this area has been 
conducted in Western countries (e.g., Reeder et al., 1982; Rusconi et al., 2017; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987, 1992; Tausch et al., 2007). Rusconi et al. (2017) found the same pattern of 
results, although with a different magnitude, in an Italian and an American sample (Rusconi 
et al., 2017, Study 4). It is thus possible that more pronounced differences can be found when 
comparing Western as opposed to non-Western participants given the different consideration 
of situational information (e.g., Morris & Peng, 1994) as well as conceptualizations of 
morality (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998, 
footnote 2) across societies. 
Time is another variable that could explain the differences in perceivers’ assumptions 
about other people’s morality. In the US, public’s trust and confidence in politicians and 
American people has declined from the early 1970s to 2018, but with fluctuations (Jones & 
Saad, 2018). However, public’s trust in professions among British adults aged 15 and over 
has been relatively stable between 1983 and 2017 (Ipsos MORI, 2017). In addition, it should 
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be noted that the results of the studies conducted in this field with respect to the presence of a 
negativity effect in the morality domain have been relatively consistent between the 1970s 
and the 2010s (Reeder et al., 1982; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; 
Tausch et al., 2007). Thus, more empirical evidence to support the hypothesis of variations in 
culture and time at the basis of the shift in perceivers’ expectations is needed. 
The theoretical implication highlighted by this review of the main moderators of the 
negativity effect is that the properties of traits, correspondent and non-correspondent 
behaviors and their relations play an important role in determining the negativity effect. 
However, also variables related to how the observers perceive the actors in terms of their 
relational closeness as well as their goals and intentions play a role in determining the 
enhanced weight for negative events. 
Theoretical and Empirical Inconsistencies: A Trajectory for the Field 
As emerged from the previous analysis of moderators of the negativity effect, there 
are some theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in this research field. In this section, we 
will address them and we will outline the trajectory for this research area. 
Frequency and Diagnosticity. There has been a confusion between the constructs of 
diagnosticity and frequency in the literature. The term diagnosticity has been used with 
reference to different constructs by different authors (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2015; Skowronski, 2002; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1992). As 
argued by Rozin and Royzman (2001), diagnosticity and frequency correlate with one 
another, but they can be distinguished. For example, the difference between these two 
constructs has been empirically pointed out in the social hypothesis-testing literature. 
Rusconi, Sacchi, Toscano, &and Cherubini (2012) asked participants to select some questions 
from a pre-set list to investigate the presence of a series of personality traits in an anonymous 
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target person. They were also asked whether they expected to receive an answer confirming 
the tested trait or a disconfirming answer as well as the probability of receiving it. 
Participants exhibited a differential pattern of confirming expectations as a function of 
answer frequency (defined as likelihood to occur) and answer diagnosticity (defined as 
informativeness from a Bayesian perspective). The confirming expectations were higher 
when the confirming answers were moderately diagnostic and frequent compared to when 
there was a diagnosticity/frequency trade-off (i.e., confirming answers were either highly 
diagnostic but rare or vice versa). These results show that perceivers are sensitive to the 
congruency or incongruency of cue diagnosticity and cue frequency. 
Skowronski and Carlston (1987) drew the concept of diagnosticity in impression 
formation from the categorization literature. The diagnosticity of a cue depends on its ability 
to predict a trait category, thus even a frequent cue can be diagnostic if it leads to an accurate 
trait categorization. However, in Mende-Siedlecki et al. (2013)’s study, diagnosticity has 
been used with reference to a different conceptualization of informativeness. According to 
the authors, cue diagnosticity is an emergent property of cue frequency, and thus a rare cue is 
more informative than a common cue. Rather than diagnosticity as defined in the category 
learning theory, the latter conceptualization refers more squarely to the constructs of 
“surprisal” (Tribus, 1961), “self-information” in information theory (Rusconi, Crippa, Russo, 
& Cherubini, 2012), and the “rarity assumption” in the Bayesian reasoning literature 
(Anderson, 1990; McKenzie, 2006; McKenzie & Chase, 2012; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 
2000, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Rusconi & McKenzie, 2013), whereby “answers, or 
test outcomes, are diagnostic to the extent that they are rare or surprising” (McKenzie, 2006, 
p. 580). Future work should differentiate the terminology used to define the constructs of 
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diagnosticity as emerged from the categorization literature and diagnosticity as defined in the 
information-theory field.  
In addition, a gap in recent research on behavior frequency (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 
2013; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2015) is that it does not provide a direct comparison of the rarity 
account against any other explanatory mechanisms. Thus, for example, there is a lack of 
systematic investigations on the relation between categorization diagnosticity and 
information-theory diagnosticity that pits them against one another and clarifies the way they 
relate to cue frequency in light of people’s sensitivity to and implicit assumptions about the 
rarity of events (McKenzie & Chase, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 1994).  
In their review of the negativity effect in impression formation, Rozin and Royzman 
(2001, p. 308) pointed out that the frequency and diagnosticity accounts share the prediction 
of a positivity effect, whereby social perceivers would weigh more a single, positive behavior 
(e.g., an exceptional performance on a test) than some negative behaviors (e.g., some fails) 
when the trait to be inferred is positive and rare (e.g., high intelligence; see (Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1992). They also argued that both the frequency and diagnosticity accounts lack 
explanatory power for the negativity effect in the morality domain. They claimed that 
extremely moral behaviors (e.g., saving lives) are as infrequent and diagnostic as extremely 
immoral acts (e.g., murders), despite the latter receiving enhanced weight (Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001, p. 310). Systematic, empirical investigations of these theorizations, for 
example by orthogonally manipulating frequency and diagnosticity, should clarify their 
respective role in producing the negativity effects. 
Measures of Trait-Behavior Relations and Levels of Trait/Behavior Evaluative Extremity. 
The inconsistencies of the results about the positivity and negativity effects at different levels 
of evaluative extremity could be resolved by taking into account the interplay between the 
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different measures of trait-behavior relations (potential, intended, and general variabilities) 
and the (moderate vs. extreme) levels of both traits and behaviors in the morality vs. 
competence domains. The manipulation of the level of evaluative extremity of traits and 
behaviors would require a stricter definition of “moderate” and “extreme”. A 
parameterization of the different levels of evaluative extremity based on the observers’ self-
reports and also their physiological reactions would reduce the statistical noise that the 
ambiguity of the labels such as “very honest” might have generated in previous studies in the 
literature. This could also provide a basis for more squarely testing the interplay between the 
cognitive, and the motivational and affective variables underlying the negativity effect. 
An additional measurement aspect that future research in the field could take into 
account is the trait scale used to assess people’s attributions. Typically, the scales used in the 
literature to assess trait judgments employ a bipolar continuum encompassing both trait 
categories implicated by the behaviors on which the trait judgments are based (e.g., very 
dishonest to very honest). Although observers might tend to reinterpret a unipolar scale as a 
bipolar scale, there is evidence in the literature indicating that using unipolar scales can 
unveil effects that could cancel each other out when using bipolar scales (Gamblin, Banks, & 
Dean, 2019). As previously discussed, the cue-diagnosticity account predicts positivity and 
negativity effects only when more than a single trait category is implicated by the available 
evidence. If  unipolar scales to judge the presence of a single trait category (e.g., absence of 
honesty to presence of honesty or absence of dishonesty to presence of dishonesty) were 
used, we should observe no, or, if anything, reduced positivity and negativity effects, which 
could provide evidence in favor of the informativeness-based models, such as the cue-
diagnosticity account, while being problematic for affect-based accounts without any 
additional assumptions1. 
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The Role of Affect. In contrast with the results supporting the role of affective reactions in 
producing the negativity effect in the morality domain (Trafimow et al., 2005), Skowronski 
(2002) showed that evaluative (likability and goodness) judgments of targets did not mediate 
trait judgments, and thus affective reactions to targets were not the basis for trait ratings 
(Skowronski, 2002, Experiment 2). Also, there was no negativity effect in the evaluative 
judgments of targets based on honest vs. dishonest behaviors when targets were described by 
a consistent set of behaviors. Instead, there was an equal polarization of the participants’ 
evaluations of honesty and dishonesty. Furthermore, both with inconsistent and consistent 
behavior sets, there was a mismatch between the negative intelligence ratings and non-
negative evaluations of targets who either mostly or consistently behave in an unintelligent 
way. Similarly, evaluative reactions to behaviors did not suggest a role of affect in the 
asymmetric influence of behaviors on judgments about morality and competence 
(Skowronski, 2002, Experiment 1).  
A possible reason for these discrepant results on the role of affect lies in the way this 
construct was operationalized in the two studies. While Skowronski (2002) focused on 
evaluations of the goodness or likability of behaviors and targets, Trafimow et al. (2005) 
examined both valence (participants’ positive/negative feelings) and specific emotions such 
as disgust, sadness, and fear (Trafimow et al., 2005, Study 5). Future research should clarify 
these inconsistencies for example by orthogonally testing different operationalizations of 
affect (e.g., in terms of likability vs. emotions). In addition, future research could consider the 
differences between negativity effects that are affective (defense-based, e.g., fear that relates 
to the avoidance of negative stimuli) and those that are informational (orienting-based, to 
control the sources of negative stimuli, Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). 
Conclusions 
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Although there is consensus around the notion that negative events are weighed more 
than positive ones in forming impressions of others and in trait attribution, there is no such 
agreement on the underlying mechanisms. Indeed, although the informativeness-based 
models such as the cue-diagnosticity account and the schematic model have received support 
and they are able to account for several results in the literature (e.g., Skowronski, 2002), there 
are still areas that deserve empirical investigation. An example is the relative contribution of 
cognitive and affective variables to the negativity effect in the morality domain (e.g., 
Skowronski, 2002; Trafimow et al., 2005). Our review shows that the cognitive and 
motivational- and affect-based accounts of the negativity effect are compatible and they can 
jointly contribute to a deeper understanding of this phenomenon (e.g., Alicke & Sedikides, 
2009; De Bruin and Van Lange, 2000; Rusconi et al., 2017; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Skowronski et al., 1991; Walker et al., 1997). 
In addition, the boundary conditions to the negativity effect emerged throughout 
decades of research provide the basis for studies that could resolve some of the theoretical 
and empirical inconsistencies emerged in the literature. In addition to the role of trait content 
(morality vs. competence, e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 
1989), the negativity effect is qualified by the consistency of the behaviors on which the 
judgment is based (Lupfer et al., 2000; Skowronski, 2002), the level of categorization and 
perceived target entitativity (Coovert & Reeder, 1990; Skowronski, 2002; Welbourne, 1999), 
the level of evaluative extremity of traits and behaviors (Rusconi et al., 2017; Wojciszke, 
Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993), beliefs in lay theories of personality (Skowronski, 2002), and 
self-enhancement and the relationship between the observer and the actor (e.g., Alicke & 
Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Skowronski et 
al., 1991; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Another moderator is the type of measurement used 
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to test trait-behavior relations (Reeder et al., 1982; Rusconi et al., 2017). The literature has 
focused on the perceived frequency of behaviors (Fiske, 1980; Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2015) and on associated measures such as the general variability one 
(Reeder et al., 1982; Rusconi et al., 2017; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Tausch et al., 2007). 
This leaves relatively untested the measures that should more clearly distinguish between 
judgments of morality (the intended variability measure) and competence (the potential 
variability measure, Reeder et al., 1982; Skowronski, 2002). 
Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) hierarchically restrictive schema applies mostly to 
extreme levels of both traits (e.g., “a ruthless con man”, Reeder & Brewer, 1979, p. 68) and 
behaviors (e.g., “embezzlement”, Reeder & Brewer, 1979, p. 68). Although behavior 
extremity as a moderator of trait attribution has been taken into account (Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987; Wojciszke et al., 1993), there is scant, systematic research considering trait 
extremity in relation to behavior extremity (Reeder et al., 1982). However, a recent focus on 
the moderate levels of both traits and behaviors has revealed the social perceivers’ cynical 
expectations about actors’ frequency of emission of moral behaviors (e.g., Rusconi et al., 
2017). These negative assumptions about other people’s morality (see also Meindl et al., 
2016) question the traditionally assumed moderately positive expectations of the social 
perceiver (Fiske, 1980; Helson, 1947, 1948; Jones & Davis, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1967) and 
deserve further investigation to unveil potential variations across cultures and historical 
periods.  
Future research would also benefit from a parameterization of the levels of evaluative 
extremity of both traits and behaviors. More precise definitions of relevant constructs such as 
“affect” and “diagnosticity” could also help resolve some of the theoretical and empirical 
inconsistencies in the literature. An example, is the clarification of the relation between 
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behavior frequency and diagnosticity and their respective roles in producing the negativity 
effect (Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). 
Finally, the hierarchically restrictive schema has been the focus of several 
investigations, but the two other schemata proposed in Reeder and Brewer’s (1979) 
schematic model still deserve a systematic empirical investigation, namely the “partially 
restrictive schema” (typical of traits such as “friendly”/”unfriendly”, Figure 3) and the “fully 
restrictive schema” (applicable to traits such as “neat”/“sloppy”, Figure 4). 
As shown by our review, the motivational and affective bases of the negativity effect 
are intertwined with the cognitive variables and processes, thus an integrated approach is 
needed to foster our understanding of the negativity effect. Such approach could clarify the 
role of negativity in moderating intergroup biases (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, pp. 
586-587). It could also complement the contribution of studies in social perception and 
intergroup relations that rely on socio-functionalist accounts to explain the primary role of 
morality in impression formation and update (e.g., Brambilla et al., 2013; van der Lee, 
Ellemers, Scheepers, & Rutjens, 2017). 
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Footnote  
1 We thank John Skowronski for the suggestions reported in this subsection. 
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Figure 1. Representation of the hierarchical restrictive schema for extreme levels of positive 
and negative morality-related traits and behaviors according to Reeder and Brewer's (1979) 
model. + and - indicate traits/behaviors of extremely positive and negative valence, 
respectively (moderate levels are not included in this representation). The solid arrows 
indicate strong trait-behavior relations. 
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Figure 2. Representation of trait-behavior relations for moderate levels of positive and 
negative morality-related traits and behaviors according to Rusconi et al. (2017). + and - 
indicate traits/behaviors of positive and negative valence, respectively. The solid arrow 
indicates a strong trait-behavior relation, while the dashed arrow indicates a weak trait-
behavior relation. 
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Figure 3. Representation of the trait-behavior relations according to the partially restrictive 
schema (modified from Reeder & Brewer, 1979, Figure 2). +, ± , and - indicate extremely 
positive, moderate, and extremely negative trait/behaviors, respectively. The solid arrow 
indicates a strong trait-behavior relation, while the dashed arrow indicates a weak trait-
behavior relation. Without any specific information about the context this schema predicts 
moderate levels of behaviors that are not very informative about the implied traits. However, 
moderate behaviors can be informative about the underlying traits if there are situations that 
demand for extreme behaviors (Reeder & Brewer, 1979, Figure 3).  
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Figure 4. Representation of the trait-behavior relations according to the fully restrictive 
schema (modified from Reeder & Brewer, 1979, Figure 5). +, ± , and - indicate extremely 
positive, moderate, and extremely negative trait/behaviors, respectively. The thick solid 
arrows indicate the strong trait-behavior relation at all levels (extremely positive, neutral, and 
extremely negative) predicted by this schema, according to which people emit a restricted 
range of behaviors consistent with the trait level they possess. "¬ TRAIT" indicates the 
absence of a trait, which is implied whenever a person emits behaviors at all levels of the 
continuum in different circumstances. 
